Expositor 2: Noé Garric (École Polytechnique, París)
Abstract: In this talk, we present the Principal-Agent problem, which models optimal economical contracts with information asymmetry. We first state the problem, and motivate its constraints. Then, we define risk-averse players in our setting. We also define the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property, and give its intuitive interpretation. Finally, we make the first-order approach : we replace a constraint by its first-order approximation, and give necessary conditions such that the optimal solutions of the problem do not change.
Fecha y lugar: Miércoles 20 de agosto, 12:00hrs, Sala Seminario Felipe Álvarez (5to piso)
Invitación link zoom:
https://uchile.zoom.us/j/93417604828?pwd=eSHafQqVcAegttXqKH3swXZsMseRrn.1